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Women Shaping the Legal
Process: Judicial Gender Bias
as Grounds for Reversal
BY LYNN HECHT SCHAFRAN*
O n June 27, 1995, three male judges of the California Court of
Appeal reversed a case called Catchpole v. Brannon' specifi-
cally because of the trial judge's gender bias.2 The opinion is an embodi-
ment of women's success in reshaping the law to reflect women's
concerns and experiences, a goal the first suffragists considered second
only to securing the vote. The Declaration of Sentiments adopted at the
First Women's Rights Convention at Seneca Falls, New York in 1848
opens with these words:
The history of mankind is a history of repeated injuries and
usurpations on the part of man toward woman, having in direct object
the establishment of an absolute tyranny over her. To prove this, let
facts be submitted to a candid world.
He has never permitted her to exercise her inalienable right to the
elective franchise.
He has compelled her to submit to laws, in the formation of which
she had no voice.3
The reversal in Catchpole rests on a ground - gender bias in the
courts - that did not exist until women lawyers, women judges, and
women law professors created it. Even the underlying cause of action in
this case - sexual harassment - did not exist until women lawyers and
* Director, National Judicial Education Program to Promote Equality for
Women and Men in the Courts, a project of the NOW Legal Defense and
Education Fund in cooperation with the National Association of Women Judges.
B.A. 1962, Smith College; M.A. 1965, J.D. 1974, Columbia University.
'42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 440 (Ct. App. 1995), review denied (Cal. Sept 14, 1995).2 Id. at 441.
3 1 ELIZABETH C. STANTON ET AL., HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 70
(2d ed. 1889) (containing the Declaration of Sentiments - Adopted by the First
Women's Rights Convention, Seneca Falls, N.Y., July 19, 1848).
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law professors made it a legal concept.4 Until then, women just called it
life.
Catchpole was a bench-tried sexual harassment case involving an
alleged rape by a supervisor, and a plaintiff who did not physically resist.
The trial judge was so convinced of the myth that a woman who is
"truly" being raped will physically resist that, even though the supervisor
admitted to the assault in a call monitored by the police, the judge could
not get past his own preconceptions. His behavior and decision exemplify
every negative attitude toward sexual harassment cases described by the
state and federal task forces on gender bias in the courts - also the
creation of women lawyers and judges - as well as how adherence to
rape myths produces gender-biased decision making. The trial judge
called sexual harassment cases "'detrimental to everyone concerned"'"
and described this case as "nonsense."6 He showed extreme irritation at
having to listen to plaintiff's witnesses. He subjected the plaintiff alone,
among all the witnesses, to a scathing interrogation that reads as if it
were scripted by Lord Hale, author of the infamous jury charge that rape
is a crime easy to charge and difficult to defend so the female complain-
ant must be examined with extra caution. The judge asked the plaintiff
whether she blamed herself for letting the assault happen,7 whether her
father blamed her;' and whether she had considered "just leaving without
your clothes?"9 He wrote in his Tentative Decision that the situation was
unbelievable, she was at fault for not successfully resisting, and that it
could be inferred that she pursued her supervisor. '°
The case was appealed on the ground that the judge's gender bias
required setting aside his judgment. The Court of Appeal held that "the
allegations of gender bias are meritorious"'" and reversed and remanded
for a new trial before a different judge. The court wrote: "the phrase 'due
process of law' ... minimally contemplates the opportunity to be fully
and fairly heard before an impartial decision-maker."'" The court
4 CATHARINE A. MACKiNNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN 59-82 (1979).
- Catchpole, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 446.6 Id. at 448.
7 Id. at 451.
8 Id. at 447.
9 Id. at 450.
'
0 Id. at 451.
"Id. at 441.
12 Id. at 443.
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concluded that "the judge's expressed hostility to sexual harassment cases
and the ... misconceptions he adopted provide a reasonable person
ample basis upon which to doubt whether appellant received a fair
trial"
13
Gender bias in the courts is a concept that did not exist before the
National Organization for Women Legal Defense and Education Fund
("NOW LDEF") created the National Judicial Education Program to
Promote Equality for Women and Men in the Courts ("NJEP") in
1980.14 When NOW LDEF itself was founded in 1970, lawyers on the
new board were keenly aware of the difficulties they were experiencing
in using the then-new Civil Rights Act of 1964 on behalf of women
victims of employment discrimination. As board member Marilyn Patel,
now a federal district court judge, later described it:
I recall that when I was working on what were called "discrimination"
cases, I believed that I knew what constituted the burden of proof.
Congress appeared to have made that very clear. We all felt that we
knew what was meant by a preponderance of the evidence. But I found
that usually there was an additional burden of proof for women. Many
of the male judges I knew were not aware or did not believe that certain
things did or could happen to women, or that women were discriminat-
ed against or treated in an unjust fashion."
These experiences led NOW LDEF's new board to propose a project that
would go into judges' continuing education programs and teach about the
ways gender bias affects judicial decision making and court interaction.
The funding community's response was that this was a silly idea, totally
unnecessary, because judges are impartial - that is their job description.
After ten years of effort, when NOW LDEF formally established
NJEP and invited the then newly formed National Association of Women
Judges to become NJEP's co-sponsor, many knowledgeable judges,
lawyers, and journalists told NOW LDEF that this was an impossible
project because no one would take it seriously; judges would not admit
that there was such a problem as gender bias in the courts or accept it as
13 Id. at 446.
14 Norma Juliet Wilder, On the Judicial Agenda for the 80s: Equal
Treatment for Men and Women in the Courts, 64 JUDICATURE 202 (1980).
"5 Nat'l Judicial Educ. Program to Promote Equality for Women and Men
in the Courts, Judicial Discretion: Does Sex Make a Difference?, Instructor's
Manual 5 (1981).
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a legitimate topic for judicial education and reform. How wrong they
were is demonstrated by the appellate court's opinion in Catchpole.
NJEP's focus on developing state-specific information about gender
bias in the courts to minimize denial of the problem in its judicial
education programs became the catalyst for a series of high level state
and federal task forces mandated to examine the nature and extent of
gender bias in their respective jurisdictions and to recommend and
implement reforms. 6 Many of these task forces adopted the three part
definition of gender bias introduced by NJEP, and it is this definition that
guided the California Court of Appeal in Catchpole. The court wrote,
For purposes of this opinion, we accept the definition of "gender bias"
developed by the [California] Judicial Council Advisory Committee on
Gender Bias in the Courts, which provides that "gender bias includes
behavior or decision making of participants in the justice system which
is based on or reveals (1) stereotypical attitudes about the nature and
roles of women and men; (2) cultural perceptions of their relative
worth; and (3) myths and misconceptions about the social and economic
realities encountered by both sexes."' 7
The appellate court also cited the findings of the California and Ninth
Circuit task forces with respect to some judges' disdain for sexual
harassment cases and the twenty-three gender bias task force reports that
have discussed women's lack of credibility in the courts. 8 The Ninth
Circuit Gender Bias Task Force report states: "In sexual harassment or
discrimination cases before [many male and some female judges],
,6 Lynn Hecht Schafran, Documenting Gender Bias in the Courts: The Task
Force Approach, 70 JUDICATURE 280 (1987); Lynn Hecht Schafran, Educating
the Judiciary About Gender Bias: The National Judicial Education Program to
Promote Equality for Women and Men in the Courts and the New Jersey
Supreme Court Task Force on Women in the Courts, 9 WOMEN's RTs. L. REP.
109 (1986); Lynn Hecht Schafran, Overwhelming Evidence: Reports on Gender
Bias in the Courts, 26 TRIAL 28 (1990).
'" Catchpole v. Brannon, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 440, 442 n.2 (Ct. App. 1995)
(quoting JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., ACHIEVING EQUAL JUSTICE FOR WOMEN
AND MAEN IN THE COURTs: THE DRAFT REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL
ADvIsORY Comm. ON GENDER BIAs IN THE CoURTs 2 (1990)).
18 Id. at 452 n.10. For a comprehensive discussion of this critical issue, see
Lynn Hecht Schafran, Credibility in the Courts: Why is There a Gender Gap?,
JUDGES' J., Winter 1995, at 5.
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plaintiffs' lawyers report a minimization of their clients' trauma and 'an
across the board lack of understanding' as to the female plaintiff's
situation and point of view."19 The task force observed that district court
judges tend to refuse to permit expert witness testimony as to what
constitutes sexual harassment, apparently assuming that they know,
despite extensive and widely reported social science research showing that
women and men have sharply contrasting views on this question.2" One
focus group participant summed up the task force's findings on the
attitudes sexual harassment plaintiffs sometimes encounter in the courts:
the judges "'don't get it; they don't try to get it; they don't know the
law, and it's just an uphill battle all the way.' "21 The Catchpole trial
judge's attitude toward this case was certainly that of someone who didn't
get it.
The California Court of Appeal also found that the Catchpole trial
judge violated Canon 3 of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct which
directs that a judge "shall not.., by words or conduct manifest bias or
prejudice ... based upon.., sex. ' This is a new canon promulgated
in 1990 in the American Bar Association Model Code of Judicial
Conduct, which is the model for the states' codes.23 Prior to this, there
was only Canon 2 which states: "A judge shall avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all of the judge's activities. " ' The decision
of the ABA Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility to
propose an amendment to the Model Code of Judicial Conduct that goes
beyond the general directive of Canon 2 and states explicitly that judges
may not manifest biased behavior based on sex or race is a direct
response to the findings of the task forces on gender bias in the courts
and the task forces on racial and ethnic bias in the courts to which the
gender bias task forces gave rise.
Perhaps the most tangible expression in Catchpole of women's
contribution to the legal process over the seventy-five years since suffrage
is the appellate court's discussion of the trial judge's attitude toward rape.
19 Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force, The Effects of Gender in the
Federal Courts, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 745, 887 (1994).20 Id. at 891.
21 Id. at 887.
22 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 (1990).
23 Lynn Hecht Schafran, The Obligation to Intervene: New Direction from
the American Bar Association Code of Judicial Conduct, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICs 53 (1990).
24 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (1990).
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Nowhere has the compelled submission of women to "laws, in the
formation of which she had no voice"' had more brutal consequences
than for the victims of rape, who are overwhelmingly women. At the time
of suffrage and until the rape reform movement of the 1960s and 1970s,
rape law was a codified expression of men's mistrust of women. Despite
the advent of rape shield laws barring excavation of the complainant's
prior sexual history, and the elimination of the requirements for earnest
resistance and corroboration of every element of the crime, some judges
are still locked into the stereotypes that have long made the prosecution
of these cases a revictimization for the victim.2
6
The Catchpole trial judge's attitude toward the trauma of rape and his
lack of understanding of how victims experience sexual assault were
appalling. After the director of the North Coast Rape Crisis team testified
about the symptoms of rape trauma syndrome and opined that the
plaintiff exhibited them all, the judge suggested that "the witness 'should
check and see if [rape victims] come in with a big 'R' stamped on their
forehead in red letters, and then we'll all know.'"'" The plaintiff's
supervisor had gotten her to his home after work on the pretense of
discussing personnel issues relating to her job performance. The trial
judge could not comprehend why the plaintiff did not leave her supervi-
sor's home or fight back. He questioned her as to why, as the night went
on and her supervisor did not get to business, she did not act. "'But
couldn't you have easily said, 'No, not tonight. I'm tired. I have got to
go to school tomorrow. I'll talk about it later.' Why not? Why didn't you
say that?"' Plaintiff responded, "'I didn't feel that I could"' and "'I
didn't want to offend him.' "28 This is a classic scenario in nonstranger
rape cases because women are socialized not to offend.29
The court of appeals wrote,
The court's disparagement of appellant's credibility on the grounds that
she acceptedBrannon's invitation to come to his house, remained alone
5 STANTON, supra note 3, at 70.
26 Lynn Hecht Schafran, Eve, Mary, Superwoman: How Stereotypes About
Women Influence Judges, JUDGE's J., Winter 1985, at 12; Lynn Hecht Schafian,
Writing and ReadingAbout Rape: A Primer, 66 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 979 (1993).
27 Catchpole v. Brannon, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 440, 448 (Ct. App. 1995).
28 Id. at 449.
29 For a further discussion of this point and another court that did not "get
it," see Lynn Hecht Schafran, Criminal Law: What is Forcible Compulsion?,
JUDGES' J., Winter 1995, at 43.
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with him, and did not resist his assault more forcibly is based on an
unrealistic and gender biased standard of reasonableness. Among other
things, the court appears oblivious to appellant's dependence on the
assailant for her job and scholarship and the need to placate him for
those reasons. The court was equally indifferent to the intimidation a
woman in appellant's position would likely experience."
The appellate court observed that the trial judge's demand for
physical resistance ignored both legislation and case law. In 1980 and
1982 the California Penal Law was amended to remove resistance
requirements and make clear that failure to resist could not be used to
show consent.3" In 1986 the California Supreme Court, in the leading
case of People v. Barnes,2 rejected the notion that failure to resist
equals consent and described the reasons women often do not resist, for
example, they are frozen with fright, or fear even greater physical injury
if they fight back.33
THE NEED FOR CONSTANT VIGILANCE
While the appellate court's decision in Catchpole is indeed cause for
rejoicing, we must be constantly mindful that one decision does not a
legal revolution make. The need for constant attention to educating the
judiciary about the realities of women's lives is painfully reflected in the
decision of another California appellate court in the year prior to
Catchpole.
In People v. Iniguez 4 a woman was asleep at the home of a close
family friend whom she thought of as her aunt when she awoke to find
the "aunt's" boyfriend - a man about whom she knew only that he
weighed one hundred pounds more than she and had drunk a lot at dinner
- looming naked over her. Without a word the man pulled off her
underwear and raped her. The appellate panel in that case reduced the
man's rape conviction to "sexual battery" on the ground that evidence of
force and fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury was insufficient.
The court wrote:
30 Catchpole, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 452.
31 Id. at 452-54.
32 721 P.2d 110 (Cal. 1986).
1 Id. at 118-19.
34 872 P.2d 1183 (Cal. 1994).
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While the [defendant] was admittedly much larger than the small victim,
he did nothing to suggest that he intended to injure her. No coarse or
sexually suggestive conversation had taken place. Nothing of an abusive
or threatening nature had occurred. The victim was sleeping in her
aunt's house, in which screams presumably would have raised the aunt
and interrupted the intercourse. Although the assailant was a stranger to
the victim, she knew nothing about him which would suggest that he
was violent.35
This last sentence is truly disturbing. A woman is awakened in the
night by a naked man who is a virtual stranger to her hovering over her
body. It seems intuitive that this situation spells DANGER, yet this court
did not see it. 6 Fortunately the California Supreme Court reinstated the
rape conviction with an opinion that includes an excellent discussion of
frozen fright.37
WE ARE MAKING PROGRESS
The 75th anniversary of woman suffrage is one of those occasions
when we ask the proverbial question: is the glass half empty or half full?
For those of us working to realize the goals of the First Women's Rights
Convention in their fullest sense, it often seems that the glass is filling all
too slowly. But comparing how much has been achieved in the years
since that 1848 convention sparked the 26th Amendment with the status
quo of the preceding millennia is fortifying. In classical Athens, women's
legal status was so degraded that not only were women legally incompe-
tent, but so was a man acting under a woman's influence; by statute, any
legal action initiated by a man that was conceived under a woman's
influence was invalid.3" By 1848 in the United States, women's status
had progressed to the point that there was no such statute, but married
women could still not bring a lawsuit in their own names.
When we consider that the concept of gender bias in the courts did
not exist until 1980, the fact that a mere fifteen years later three male
appellate judges would begin an opinion with the statement, "[t]his case
presents the unusual question whether the alleged gender bias of the trial
3" Id. at 1186 (alteration in original).
36 See also Schafran, supra note 29, at 45.
17 Id. at 1188-90.
38 EVA C. KEULS, THE REIGN OF THE PHALLUS 322 (1985).
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judge requires us to set aside his judgment"'39 and clearly answer "yes,"
we know we are making progress at what historians would consider warp
speed. The appellate court decision in Catchpole v. Brannon is a
landmark in women's efforts to create laws and legal process that reflect
the realities of women's lives.
11 Catchpole v. Brannon, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 440, 441 (Ct. App. 1995).
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